![]() If they are not consistent with physicalism, then they will be strongly emergent. If they are consistent with physicalism, then they will be weakly emergent. According to Wilson, assuming a metaphysics in which the base-level entities are all physical, views that say some phenomenon is metaphysically emergent may either be consistent with physicalism, or not consistent with physicalism. ![]() Most of my discussion in what follows will concern the first part of the book, in which Wilson proposes an exhaustive taxonomy of the varieties of metaphysical emergence. The reality of strong emergence is a bit more controversial, but the most plausible instances of it come, in Wilson’s view, from libertarian free will. The short answer is that yes, there is plausibly a lot of what Wilson calls weak metaphysical emergence at our world. ![]() The second part applies these accounts to determine whether it is plausible that any phenomena actually are metaphysically emergent in either of these senses. The first part of this book consists in an argument that these are the only two accounts of emergence that are viable and coherent. They may be emergent in her weak sense, which is compatible with physicalism, or another strong sense, which is not. In this book, she argues that there are really only two senses in which phenomena may be metaphysically emergent. In a series of papers starting in 1999, Wilson has defended a rightly influential account of what she deems to be one species of metaphysical emergence, weak emergence, based on a causal powers metaphysics. Despite its wide-ranging discussion of subjects from complexity science and nonlinear systems to the hard problem of consciousness and free will, Jessica Wilson’s first monograph is a coherent, clear, and tightly-argued defense of her approach to the topic.
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